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The Decision to Realize Hydraulic Potentia1 1 
The contrad; ct; on ; nherent ; n a potent; all y hydrau 1 ; c 1 andscape ; s 
man; fest. Such a 1 andscape has an ; nsuffi c; ent ra i nfa 11 or none at all, 
but it possesses other accessible sources of water supply. If man decides 
to utilize such sources, he may transform dry lands into fertile fields and 
gardens. He may, but will he? What makes him engage in an adventure which 
involves great effort and which is fraught with highly problematic institu-
tional consequences? 
Historical evidence reveals that numerous groups of persons have made 
this decision; it also reveals that many others have failed to do so. Over 
millenia, tribal gatherers, hunters, fishermen, and pastoralists inhabited 
potentially hydraulic regions, often in close proximity to irrigation 
farmers, but few abandoned their traditional occupations for a hydroagri-
cul tural way of 1 ife. 
The agrari an a 1 ternati ve had a 1 imi ted--and very di verse--appea 1 to 
nonfarming groups when cUltivation was primitive and leadership not overly 
demanding. After the emergence of stratified agricultural societies, 
choice became even more serious. The authority wielded by governments and 
wealthy landowners of nearby agararian states acted as a deterent, because 
under these conditions the shift might involve submission to distasteful 
methods of political and proprietary control. Although women, children, 
and war captives might till a few fields close to a campsite, the dominant 
members of the tribe, the adult males, stubbornly refused to abandon their 
hunting, fishing, or herding activities. The many primitive peoples who 
endured lean years and even long periods of famine without making the 
10rganization and paraphrasing of this section are from: K. A. Wit-
tfogel, Oriental Despotism (Chapter 1, pt D). New Haven: Val e University 
Press, 1957. 
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crucial changeover to agriculture demonstrates the il1111ense attraction of 
nonmaterial values when increased material security can be obtained only at 
the price of political, economic, and cultural submission. 
The transition to irrigation farming poses the problem of choice in a 
still more complex form. The primary choice--whether or not to start 
hydroagricu1 ture where it had not been known previous1y--was generally, 
though perhaps not exclusively, made by groups familiar with the techniques 
of primitive rainfall farming. Notwithstanding such background, the choice, 
once made, brought wi th ita new rea 1 i zati on: i rri gati on farmi ng ao1 ways 
requires more physical effort than rainfall farming performed under compa-
rable conditions. 
But it requires radical, social and political adjustments only in a 
special geohistorical setting. Strictly local tasks of digging, damming, 
and water distribution can be performed by a single husbandman, a single 
fami 1 y, or a sma 11 group of nei ghbors and, in thi s case, no far reachi ng 
organizational steps are necessary. Hydroagriculture--farming based on 
small scale irrigation--requires more effort and increases the food supply, 
but does not involve the patterns of organization and social control that 
characterize hydrau1 ic agricu1 ture and "oriental despotism." 
These patterns come into being when an experimenting community of 
farmers or protofarmers find large sources of moisture in a dry but poten-
tially fertile area. If irrigation farming depends on the effective hand-
1 ing of a major supply of water, the distinctive qual ity of water--its 
tendency to gather in bu1k--becomes institutionally decisive. A large 
quantity of water can be channeled and kept within bounds only by the use 
of mass labor, and this mass labor must be coordinated, disciplined, and 
led. Thus, a number of farmers eager to conquer arid lowlands and plains 
are forced to invoke the organizational devices which--on the basis of 
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premachine technology--offer their one chance of success: they must work in 
cooperatf on wi th thei r fe 11 ows and subordi nate themselves to a df recti ng 
authori ty. 
The representi ti ves of ra i nfa 11 farmi ng made hi story and contro 11 ed 
certain areas of the Western World which were uniquely suited to this'kind 
of economy. But the hydrau 1"i c agri cu 1 tu ri sts outgrew and outfought the 
majority of all neighboring peoples wherever local conditions and interna-
tional circumstances one-sidedly favored an agromanageria1 economy and 
attendant statecraft. The pioneers of hydrau1 ic agricu1 ture, 1 ike the 
pioneers of rainfall farming, were unaware of the ultimate consequences of 
their choice. Pursuing recognized advantage, they initiated an insti-
tuti ona 1 deve 1 opment. whi ch 1 ed far beyond the starti ng poi nt. Thei r hei rs 
and successors built colossal political and social structures but they did 
so at the cost of many of those freedoms which the conservative dessentors 
endeavored and, in part, were able to preserve. 
The Physical and Cultural Situation in Our Day 
At this moment in history, there is still little necessity for rainfed 
regions to to be concerned with irrigation, even though some turning toward 
small and individualized hydro developments in special zones can be 
detected. The chief pressure for irrigation is in the old historic areas 
and in certain regions where bulk water could not be harnessed in earlier 
times due to lack of technique or inability to control its application. 
In traditional areas, expanding irrigation is a matter of improving 
existing systems along with possible enlargement of facilities. In China, 
for example, considerable expansion apparently has been possible by joining 
some modern construction knowledge with human-core energy. 
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Nontraditional areas obviously have a narrower historic irrigation 
foundation upon which to build and must develop physical infrastructure and 
create administrative institutions from the very beginning. Once the 
process is begun, it soon becomes clear that water storage and conveyance 
is a matter of corralling capital to apply technique. Also, resulting 
system operation may not be successful unti 1 farmers have made necessary 
mental shifts that enable them to accept the control or regimentation that 
is necessary to make a collective organization workable. (Much of the 
previous discussion al so appl ies to pumping situations; al though, -it is 
probable that a little more flexibility is retained for individuals in such 
hydroagronornY si tua ti ons. Cf. Ke 11 er & P 1 ocher, 1984.) 
In summary, there is a cultural dimension that must be taken into 
consideration in irrigation development. 
This requirement has shaped many of the elements that form the history 
of the Western U.S.A in the modern era. In the arid West, an underlying 
issue always has been: how can society obtain the benefits that private 
inititive confers in development, yet temper individuals' self-interest 
inside a collective? Unfettered individualism must be given up, yet initi-
tive retained. But this amalgam has been difficult to affect or sustain 
beyond the level of "mutual irrigation companies" except on a foundation 
of pu b 1 i c su b s i dy. (W i 1 de, 1 97 6a & b; 1 978) 
In other cultures, it may be natural for farmers to understand and 
work within a framework of coll ecti ve interests, but the 1 arger society 
will not be able to obtain dynamic economic impacts of individual innova-
tion and enterprise. An example of this might be found in the strong group 
traditions of an indigenous society such as is found among the indians in 
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the Andean Highlands. Here, even an overlay of compensating (ameliorating) 
subsidy may not call forth incentive.2 (Aitken,1983) 
Water Source Tenure 
One way or another, those who develop a water source and conveyance 
structures have to be guaranteed ownership rights. If these rights are. 
retained by the State, the possible implication is that only the State is 
in a position to guide and manage what is created. On the other hand, 
if individuals or groups have recognized tenure rights to water sources, 
automatic development will tend to occur.3 This may be seen in cases where 
a group re 1 ys on a natu ra 1 source such as a spri ng. Each fami 1 y uti 1 i zes 
the water in turn to the degree it can be Nstretched out. II 
·A person may. lise 11 II water to others if he can contro 1 ei ther the 
water or access to it. This type of ownership, of a necessary and vital 
source, causes conflict even to a greater degree than in situations where 
land is monopolized.4 If the State owns all the water, then, as ancient 
history has shown, the population will be subject to many controls of 
centra 1 i zed power. Howe ver, if the State does not choose to di rect all 
things in a despotic way, the farmers may not do all things with the 
created system that is technically feasible. That is, if the State retains 
management control and sti 11 expects vol unta'ry response, it may be 
2An Andean counter example in a non-highl and, contrasting cultural 
situation is illustrated by the explosion of atomistic irrigation develop-
ment inititive in Equador's Guayas Basin, in a situation of hydroagronomY, 
fueled by good producemarkets. (WMS, #121982). 
3Tenure does not have to extend to the source itself, although in the 
case of a spring it might. It is sufficient if "tenure" is simply a 
usufruct ri ght to the "producti on" of the source. 
4There is a tendency to try to control land areasgreat enough to 
utilize all the source, then there will be no surplus to guard or protect. 
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disappointed at the response from farmers. This suggests a possible rule 
of development; the state should only develop and control a source down to 
a 1 evel where it can create the counterpart of a "spring" for potential 
users 1 yi ng be low. The· users mi ght be expected to Ilreach up" the system as 
far as possible to find their "spring" and be responsible to develop and 
. manage a 11 the area commanded by thi s sUb-source.5 
Water Development 
In the first instance the collective can be left to its own devices. 
That is to say. if the "members" have tenure to a "spring" they can proceed 
along certain development paths themsel ves--this merely requires some 
degree of initiative and imagination (which is rewarded by the results) • 
. If a larger collective identifies a "spring," size and technical 
requirements for development may be too great for private initiative. 
Whether or not pri vate i ni ti ati ve is up to the task depends upon agreed 
tenure rights and potential economic p~offs. 
In the Western u.s. the economic payoffs were uneven; early irrigation 
companies, established as profit making entities, failed. On the other 
hand, the easy development of smaller scale sources (mainly river diver-
sions) based on investment of human and animal capital (not bank loans) , 
in a spirit of mutual self-help were more successful. 
I n modern ti mes State mandated deve 1 opment of pub 1 i c works has been 
rational ized on various grounds. One of the most commonly cited · is the 
i nabi 1 i ty of a di verse group of water users to obtai n 1 arge amounts of 
5This suggestion has been made by Jack Keller. (G. Levine) 
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investment capital.6 Obviously, once built such works are not likely to be 
any more profi tab 1 e for the State than they wou 1 d be for pri vate enter-
prise, especially since all easily developed areas have already been 
exploited. In addition, earlier irrigation works may have been situated 
to command the best 1 ands. Of course, the State may be abl e to improve 
existing simp1~ systems by introducing storage of late season water by 
irrigating additional land on the boundaries of what already exists or it 
may be able to direct some water away from current users to be employed 
elsewhere. 
As projects become more complex, legal considerations po1iferate. 
Tenure rights and their enforcement exact more and more attention and 
resources. Additional legal and legislative adjustments are needed to 
reso1 ve questions of project financing. If water beneficiaries are re-
quired to bear some financial burdens, additional restrictions are placed 
upon individuals because the money must be collected. An engineering and 
administrative technostructure emerges and eventually gathers to itself the 
trappings of power and control that authority to move and shift vital 
resources confers (i.e., a modern version of oriental despotism). 
Measuring Social Benefits of Irrigation Developement 
One reason why the concept of lithe spri ng" is important is because no 
one expects even a vol untary, non-profit co11 ecti ve to expend effort or 
resources in development unless potential payoffs are expected to cover the 
costs. Assuming the collective evaluates its alternatives carefully and 
6There is no doubt that enormous amounts of pri vate capital can be 
amassed for projects which contain adequate guarantees. But financing is a 
problem where the land security consists of a lot of separated farms, 
since the structures to be built are of little use to anyone except familes 
who work the lands below them. 
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that markets for the necessary labor, capital, and other inputs are rela-
tively free, any decision to go forward is a rough indication that society, 
as a who 1 e, wi 11 benefi t to a grea ter degree than if an a 1 terna te use of 
the resources would have been chosen. In other words, a "correct" evalu-
ation of society's opportunity costs is made somewhat automatically by 
numerous market forces playing themselves out in the private arena. 
The same opportunity cost principle may be invoked when evaluating 
economic choices made by the State. Indeed, such application is important 
because large projects tend to be expensive, and often return less than the 
va 1 ue of thei r constructi on and support resources, as measured by thei r 
value in alternative uses. The mere fact that the expected benefit/cost 
ratio exceeds unity during the planning phase does not guarantee economic 
success in operation. Irrigation projects that flop waste publicly owned 
scarce resources. Thi s hurts all ci ti zens. 7 
It should not be imagined that society actually will be reimbursed for 
the resources it devotes to irrigation works whether successful or failed. 
Such a felecific arrangement would only exist if the direct beneficiaries 
were charged the full costs of the water conveyance features constructed 
by the State.B In practice, such levies are not made although the farming 
population obtains most though not all of the direct benefits. Thus, 
whether or not society gains on balance from committing resources to irri-
gation works depends upon whether the net value of increased farmer produc-
tion is great enough to raise GNP by an amount commenserate with the 
7private projects may fail as well, but society does not bear all the 
costs since part of the failure is accounted for by destruction or loss of 
private capital or of the private labor embodied during construction. 
BIf they are charged with the "full cost," win or lose then the 
pub 1 i c wi 11 be rei mbursed for the opportuni ty costs or ffie resources com-
mitted to construction even if the project fai 1 s. 
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annua 1 i zed costs of the proj ect. The increase in GNP must be as great or 
greater than the increase in the net value of production as compared to the 
"wi thout project" state. 
In some cases, of course, the State does not expect blc > 1. The 
decision to subsidize is often but not always an indication that noneco-
nomic considerations are quite important; some goals besides enhanced 
production are invo1ved.9 
Existence of subsidy can mean only one of two things. Supposing 
stated project goal s are all economic. Subsidy may be interpreted torepre-
sent a hope that some secondary economi c benefi ts wi 11 be created by the 
project. Such benefits are hard to measure. Studies of regional economic 
impacts of big u.S. water projects are inconclusive. Not much impact on 
' . 
local economy can be attributed to them. If there are some explicit or 
imp1 icit we1 fare goal s, the subsi dy to irri gation may ·be justified on that 
basis. The whole Western u.S. irrigation program was never expected to pay 
its costs--the program had social not production goals as its foundation. 
The benefits of irrigation expenditures become even harder to measure 
when mul tipl e-purpose projects are invol ved. In the U.S.A., such purposes 
as flood control and recreation are not expected to repay costs. They are 
subsidized because they are assumed to confer important social benefits of 
a consumptive nature. They are termed consumptive because such benefits do 
not involve production or direct enhancement of economic activity. 
Public subsidy of very widely distributed consumptive activities such 
as benefits from education and defense systems or even new roadways is 
taken for granted. The tax i ng expendi ture patterns ha ve an appea rance of 
citizens paying themselves, since those who bear the subsidy by and large 
9Let us call such goals welfare enhancement. 
9 
obtain the benefits. No matter how welcome, however, enhanced consumption 
must be paid for. When the incidence of the subsiqy burden'falls upon the 
general exchequer, the question is: how far is society willing to subsidize 
consumption (for welfare purposes) of a select group? An example of a 
consumptive activity directly related to irrigation project investment is 
to create water for lawns and gardens. In such cases there is little doubt 
that local social welfare has gone up even if measured local or national 
economic impacts are negligible (and it is also possible that national 
social welfare has gone up'but that seems unlikely-and that the rest of the 
I". "L:P 
nation is willing to pay the subisidy involved). l"Realized, farm level, 
' . 
direct economic benefits can be measured. Calculations have been made 
small u.s. irrigation projects isolated from urban centers. Some of these 
results show incremental production benefits in excess of planning expec-
tations. Nevertheless,such projects still involve considerable subsidy 
"-
since direct beneficiaries do not pay interest on construction outlays. 
The World Bank re-evaluates irrigation projects from time to time and 
has published some results showing positive rates of return.l0 Evaluations 
by other donors also cite some economic successes. Re-evaluations based on 
primary beneficiary data which show success are unexceptionable. Less 
confidance should be placed on positive results built upon valuation of 
in direct benefi ts. 
Markets--The Iron law 
The American domestic market is so large that reclamation project 
designers chose to ignore whether new and additional productive output 
10 IDB also reports some positive results for a group of small projects 
in Peru. In thi s case, the enti re i rri gat; on "program" costs were not re-
evaluated; evaluation covered the 60-70% of the program money actually 
invested in "hardware." 
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could be absorbed without price effects. Price fluctuations due to 
vagaries of climate would outweigh any weakening effects of adding to 
supply. Subsidies were paid in order that reclamation farmers could 
hold costs down, while the expected higher yields would increase farm 
revenues at the going prices. 
Agricultural leaders in other regions of the nation always complained 
about recl amation activities supported by the publ ic purse because they 
objected to subsidy of increased production which appeared to be unneeded 
or unnecessarily ·competitive with what could be produced under rainfed 
conditions. They were smart enough to realize that any output increases 
were bound to depress market prices to some degree, no matter how slight, 
and to that extent the farmers in their own areas would be hurt.II 
Technical and General lessons in American Public Irrigation Experience 
The technical lesson is that just because irrigation increases yields 
and, therefore, national production, this is not a guarantee that irriga-
tion programs are an economic success. What really counts is whether the 
profi ti bi 1 ty of the producti on increases is great enough fi rst to pay for 
the extra costs of production and induce farmers to work harder (as re-
quired by intensive agriculture) and, in addition, give a further increMent 
of returns great enough to offset the cost of the project.12 
IlSince the Second World War, the complaints have been muted because 
surp 1 uses of some commodi ti es were due 1 ess or not at a 11 to subsi di zed 
rec1amstion production, than to price supports by the government, and, in 
more recent times, the market for U.S. products has expanded greatly due to 
high volumes of export. 
12 By this test, much American "reclamation" experience has been a 
fai 1 ure. 
11 
American reclamation project farmers did raise output and did make 
somewhat more money (thus sati sfyi ng the fi rst part of the profi tabi 1 i ty 
requirement) but they were never asked to pay full cost. And, it is 
unlikely that profitability of many projects would have been great enough 
to have permitted it. Inability to pass the second part of the profitabili-
ty test was always accepted by reclamation program administrators. They 
got around this problem by utilizing r~venues from the sale of generated 
electric power or municipal and industrial water to subsidize the costs of 
constructing expensive irrigation features. 
The general lesson is that profitability depends upon markets. Other 
nations cannot get away with what the Americans have attempted in the name 
of "reclamation" and social equity. 
At the same ·time, they cannot ignore the impact new project production 
will have upon existing markets. If farmers on irrigation projects in-
crease output of agricultural products, it is possible that other farmers 
may lose sa 1 es. Thus, GNP wi 11 not increase as much as expected. On the 
other hand, unless there are markets, there is little hope of obtaining, at 
the national level, clear gains in GNP at overall profitabilities 
exceeding· social opportunity costs plus rewards to farmers for extra inputs 
and effort. 
Conditions for Positive Economic Benefits from Irrigation in LOC's 
Although instances of success are reported in World Bank or .other 
evaluations, it is difficult to imagine any more than a narrow spectrum of 
situations where irrigation plays a natural, successful economic role.· As 
mentioned, the key variable is markets. Only if they are adequate is there 
any hope for farmers to cover production as well as construction costs. 
Markets for expanded agri cu 1 tu ra 1 outpu t may be opened up due to import 
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substitution or via foreign sales. These are the main short-run possibi1-
ities. Longer-run domestic markets expand due to higher on-farm consump-
tion, more raw material requirements to process intermediate food products, 
some up-grading of tastes for higher value crops and greater meat consump-
tion, but mostly there is normal demand growth due to increases in popu1a-
ti on. A 11 to 1 d, domesti c long-run markets may expand at about 4t-St per 
year. In a large country such as India, such percentages might represent a 
large absolute outlet for the increases of local production associated with 
irrigation construction. In a small nation, such percentages might not 
represent an absorbtive capacity greater than what could be satisfied from 
a small project or from technically achievable advances in yields within 
the structure of the existing agricultural system. 
Mainly the Far.erls View 
As noted, there is no necessary convergence of private and social 
vi ewpoi nts about proj ect "success". Therefore, from the standpoi nt of a 
project farmer, there is an additional outlet for his proposed production 
increase: he can take markets away from already established domestic 
producers.13 Whil e it is unl ikely that the average farmer woul d analyse 
his participation in a proposed project in such terms, project planners and 
donor agenci es ha ve no excuse for i gnori ng the zero sum and other market 
consequences yet they do it all the time. The evidence for this is found 
in the fact that planners put projects into place that are too high ~ost to 
be successful, that is, they actually do not cut the pie differently 
13This is accomplished in two ways: by driving down prices with a 
flood of excess supplies and by absolute pul ling of customers away from the 
older sources of supply by means of some sort of service or price incentive. 
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because the exi sti ng, tradi ti ona 1 areas of producti on can ho 1 d thei r own. 
Project farmers may not exploit an "additional outl et" at all. 
With this in mind, we will now concentrate on situations that do not 
involve beggar-thy-neighbor, instead project development is aimed at an 
"expanded" or "identified" market (say import substitution). 
AI. Markets avai 1 ab1 e--government wi 11 control food imports. 
i. I f another area or zone has greater compari ti ve advantage 
than the proposed proj ect, and can expand, new i rri gati on 
cannot pay unless expected unit costs are "right."14 A rise 
in real GNP depends on whether the marginal social costs of 
the increment of increased production are at least as low as the 
uni t costs of on-farm inputs in the exi sti ng, competi ng zone. 
ii. If there is no other producing area with comparative advantage, 
project output should raise real Gross National Product (GNP) to 
the degree that expected uni t costs are be low the a 1 ternati ve 
costs of imports. This combination of factors delineates the 
situation most suitable for irrigation investment. 
iii. Argument is the same for export crop production. 
A2• Domestic markets available--government cannot be relied upon to con-
trol imports 
i. A new project must be ab1 e to undercut import prices as well as 
rainfed alternatives in order to halt imports or take some rain-
fed share. If, for any reason, rainfed costs start to fall, 
14There is a grey zone where farmer unit costs are low enough , to 
outcompete the alternative source for the new market, but not low enough 
to create an adequate margin to al so cover the social costs of the irri-
gati on proj ect. 
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competition intensifies. Consumers may gain but the projects 
are uneconomi c. 
ii. A search for abso1ute-advantage-type crops begins. Project plan-
ners decide that farmers will be led, asked, or told to 
iii. A new project must be able to undercut import prices as well 
plant "high powered" fruit and vegetable crop~ but market out-
lets such crops are always narrow and extremely sensitive to 
alterations in supply, so the plan may fail. Even if a partic-
ular project manages successful penetration, follow-on projects 
cannot copy the process. Success of the initial project cannot 
be replicated except as the passage of time alters absolute 
absorbtive capacity. 
A3• It is possible to think in terms of "expanded" markets even in the 
absence of exports, or import substitution if there is absolute hun-
ger. In order to fi 11 a "hunger" gap the project must be very low 
cost, otherwise it may be better to import (for for some indeterminate 
length of time) rather than tie up scarce resources in noncompetitive 
facilities. 
B. Markets not avai1able--[this is not a realistic situation in which to 
inject new projects]. 
i • As noted a new proj ect can on 1 y be a commerci a 1 success at the 
expense of surrounding production areas. As projects come on 
1 i ne pri ces fa 11. Consumers may gai n. Pressures on 1 ess 'effi c-
ient farmers pile up. The process of displacement is accelerated. 
Measured at the national level the benefits from the program are 
mixed. 
ii. Intrinsic costs may still be too high; the project cannot suck 
busi ness from surroundi ng areas. Conti nued subsi dy is requi red 
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to get output (ie success). Farmers in competing areas who are 
basically more efficient will be driven out by the subsidized 
production from the project. After supply narrows back down 
prices may rise, subsidies may be reduced, but there is still no 
guarantee of enough profit to cover social costs as defined 
earlier. Consumers appear to gain in purchasing power because the 
terms of trade shift in their direction. This is an illusion to 
some degree because the consumers are the ones who bear the 
subsidy and at least part of any failure to cover social costs. 
These arguments i ndi cate that the most sui tab 1 e si tuati ons 
for an irrigation project require (in every instance) a pro-
ductio~ cost structure that permits competition in an efficient 
way or international comparative advantage where exports are 
concerned. In any situation where there is potential competition 
for "identified" markets from other zones or areas or there is a 
possibility of increased food imports, there is special pressure 
for the project to be cost efficient in real terms. Of course, 
there are pl aces in the world where an immense amount of irri-
gation already exists and a new project is simply a small expan-
sion of an existing structure. 
ular competition from rainfed 
Consequently, there is no partic-
agriculture. In such situ-
ations the requirement for cost effectiveness at the farmers' 
level may not be quite so pressing. 
Mainly Fro. National Level 
A. As we ha ve seen, pri mary benefi ts for proj ect farmers mayor may not 
be high enough to insure reasonable family income from the project. 
If the farmers are subsidized, they naturally seem to do better--but 
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that amount of betterness, from a national standpoint, must be accom-
panied by a raise in GNP great enough to cover the farmers production 
costs as well as to cover the social subsidy on construction. If 
farmers are required to pay the full construction costs, the potential 
for realized profit mayor may not be enough to recompense all the 
factors of production. This explains the tendency to search for 
high-price crops in order to augment the benefit stream and justify 
expensive construction. 
S. I f "hi gh powered" crop producti on is requi red in order to get a pro-
ject's SIC rati 0 up, a new sub-obj ecti ve emerges. Thi sis the 
requirement to train farmers to take on new tasks. Such tasks may 
increase the complexity of project operation by requiring farmer 
marketing support functions, or other new or different farmer organi-
zati on. More resources are requi red. 
Thi s pattern has been observed and repeated many ti mes. There 
seems to be some tendency among project leaders, planners, and 
designers, when things do not function quite as expected, to search 
for ways lito make it work" Most attempts to improve poor projects 
invo1 ve pouring more resources into the same rat hole. "Forcing a 
project to work" is the well-spring of recent development literature 
featuring all the mumbo-jumbo about farming systems. 
SlMCARY 
Irrigation benefits, in many cases, are unlikely to reward farm fami-
lies enough to fully offset construction subsidies. As a consequence, 
irrigation projects are turned into welfare programs. As we have noted 
earlier, in and of itself, this may not be necessarily evil or wrong 
because society may have other goals besides achieving higher production. 
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Nevertheless, it should be recognized that wel fare programs can absorb 
endless quantities of resources that must be paid for by someone, some-
where, someti me. 
More and more international donors are insisting upon financially 
sound projects. This requirement stiffens up the repayment burden by shift-
i ng the load from the genera 1 exchequer onto the backs of di rect benefi -
ciaries. Tightening up performance requirements is one explanation of donor 
interest in repayment ability of farmers and upon schemes to charge for 
water. Donors realize that all subsidy has to be covered and if the 
projects cannot stand on their own feet financially then the subsidy repay-
ment must come from other sectors in society. And most nations in need 
of increased production and economic development, as well as social 
programs, are not the kinds of societies that have a lot of surplus paying 
power in non-agriculture sectors. 
Another reason for the interest in repayment ability is that engineers 
want to pour concrete. They are always anxious to be abl e to show farmers 
in just what way it is possible to pay for evermore expensive under-
takings--in other words if the farmers can pay, there is 1 ess reason for 
central government to come up with the bucks. There is no new strain on 
the development budget since the farmerswillpickup the tab. 
Perhaps another reason for emphasis on repayment ability is to put 
more development emphasis on the private sector. This automatically tends 
to invol ve making the direct beneficiaries pay according to the "benefit 
principle," because water use is quite specific and chargeable. 
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